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INTRODUCTION 
 
 Each month Craigslist users post over 100 million classified advertisements onto the 
website.1 In the United States alone, there are 60 million people that use Craigslist.2 Many of 
these postings are for run-of-the-mill items such as televisions, cars, and appliances.3 In 2009, 
Angie Bauer and Jennifer Schreiner were among those 60 million users; however, the women’s 
ad was not to sell a used appliance.4 Their ad was for a sperm donor.5 Bauer and Schreiner, a 
lesbian couple, wanted to have a child of their own.6 Despite successfully raising some foster and 
adopted children together, the women’s Kansas doctor refused to sign a document deeming the 
women fit to be parents.7 Consequently, the women were unable to use a conventional sperm 
bank and receive sperm from an unknown sperm donor.   
William Marotta eventually answered the women’s ad and provided his sperm.8 The 
parties’ intentions and expectations were clear: Marotta would only be a donor and would not 
have any parental rights or responsibilities.9 To evidence their intention, the parties entered into a 
written agreement wherein Marotta’s parental rights and responsibilities were explicitly 
waived.10 Three years after the child was born using Marotta’s sperm, to Marotta’s great 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Craigslist Factsheet, CRAIGSLIST.ORG, http://www.craigslist.org/about/factsheet (last visited March 3, 
2013). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 Aly Van Dye, Topeka Mothers Support Sperm Donor in Child Support Battle with Kansas DCF, TOPEKA 
CAP. J., Dec. 29, 2013, http://cjonline.com/news/2012-12-29/Topeka-mothers-support-sperm-donor-child-support-
battle-kansas-dcf.html. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7William Saletan, Who’s the Mother in Kansas, SLATE (Jan. 8, 2013, 9:23 AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles.health_and_science/human_nature/2013/01/the_the_kansas_sperm_donor_fiasco_gay
_marriage_adoption_and_parental_responsibility.html. 
8 Elizabeth Chuck, Hey, Sperm Donor, Don’t Answer that Craigslist Ad!, NBC NEWS, (Jan. 26, 2013, 8:50 
AM), http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/01/03/16326826-hey-sperm-donor-dont-answer-that-craigslist-
ad?lite.html. 
9 Id. 
10Sperm Donor Contract, TOPEKA CAP. J., http://www,cjo-
cdn/sites/default/files/Petitioners%20Surreply.recd%201.2.2013.PDF (last visited March 3, 2013). 
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surprise, the state of Kansas filed a lawsuit against him seeking child support payments totaling 
over $6,000.11    
Kansas’s artificial insemination statute is based on the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act. 
Pursuant to the statute, “[t]he donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if he were not the birth 
father of a child thereby conceived, unless agreed to in writing by the donor and the woman.”12  
Nineteen other states have adopted some version of the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act.13  
Unfortunately for Marotta, to avoid having parental responsibilities under the Kansas statute, a 
licensed physician must perform the artificial insemination.14 Marotta donated his sperm directly 
to Bauer and Schreiner, who in-turn performed the procedure without the assistance of a licensed 
physician.15 Accordingly, Marotta cannot take advantage of the protection granted by the Kansas 
donor statute to avoid paternity and may be found liable for child support payments.  
 While the factual circumstances are interesting, Marotta’s situation is not necessarily 
unique.16 An estimated 30,000 to 60,000 children are conceived each year by use of sperm 
donors.17 Faced with this new reality, a standard is needed to effectively set the parameters of 
when known sperm donors may disclaim parental rights and responsibilities. This Comment 
focuses on when, and if, courts should allow known sperm donors to disclaim parental rights and 
responsibilities. Part I explores the 1973 and 2002 versions of the Uniform Parentage Act. Part II 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Van Dye, supra note 4. 
12 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (f) (West). 
13Why States Should Adopt UPA, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx?title=Why%20States%20Should%20Adopt%20UPA (last visited 
March 9, 2013).  In 2002, a revised version of the Uniform Parentage Act was created, but the revised version has 
only been adopted in nine states. Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited March 9, 2013). 
14 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (f) (West). 
15 Van Dye, supra note 4. 
16 See also PARKS AND RECREATION (NBC Studios 2013) (depicting a woman struggling to ask her male 
friend to be her sperm donor). 
17Jacqueline Mroz, One Sperm Donor, 150 Offspring, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2011, 
www.nytimes.com/2011/0906/health/06donor.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 
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examines the idea of intentional parentage and how that concept can be incorporated in 
determining parentage for known sperm donors. Part III looks at various state court decisions 
determining whether a known sperm donor had parental rights and responsibilities. Finally, Part 
IV argues that agreements disclaiming parental rights and responsibilities between known sperm 
donors and the prospective parent or parents should be upheld, utilizing intent based analysis. 
I.   STATUTORY INTRODUCTION: THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT 
 
 The Uniform Parentage Act (UPA) is “the most comprehensive set of laws proposed 
regarding the delineation of rights in AI cases.”18 First proposed in 1973, the UPA was revised in 
2000 and again amended in 2002.19 Unlike other Uniform Acts, however, such as the Adult 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act,20 only a minority of the states have 
adopted the most recent version of the UPA.21 Many states lack any statutory authority dealing 
with the parental status of sperm donors.22 Those states have to rely “on common law principles 
and statutes that were created when a family still consisted of one man, one woman, and their 
child.”23 Irrespective of a state’s adoption of a version of the UPA, it has been a touchstone for 
courts’ analysis concerning the parental status of sperm donors.24 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Harvey L. Fiser & Paula K. Garrett, It Takes Three, Baby: The Lack of Standard, Legal Definitions of 
“Best Interest of the Child” and the Right to Contract for Lesbian Potential Partners, 15 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 
1, 8 (2008). 
19Parentage Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Parentage%20Act (last visited March 9, 2013). 
20Adult Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Jurisdiction Act, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Adult%20Guardianship%20and%20Protective%20Proceedings%Jurisdi
ction%20Act (last visited March 9, 2013). 
21 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.   
22 Browne Lewis, Two Fathers, One Dad: Allocating the Paternal Obligations Between Men Involved in 
the Artificial Insemination Process, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 949, 988-89 (2009). 
23 Id. 
24 See infra Part III.A-B. 
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A. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act 
 As originally drafted, the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act is an “antiquated provision[] to 
modern scenarios.”25 In its entirety, section 5 states 
(a) If, under the supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her 
husband, a wife is inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her 
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child 
thereby conceived. The husband's consent must be in writing and signed by him 
and his wife. The physician shall certify their signatures and the date of the 
insemination, and file the husband's consent with the [State Department of 
Health], where it shall be kept confidential and in a sealed file. However, the 
physician's failure to do so does not affect the father and child relationship. All 
papers and records pertaining to the insemination, whether part of the permanent 
record of a court or of a file held by the supervising physician or elsewhere, are 
subject to inspection only upon an order of the court for good cause shown. 
 
(b) The donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in artificial 
insemination of a married woman other than the donor's wife is treated in law as if 
he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.26 
 
Section 5 of the 1973 UPA only 
resolves the specific legal conflict between a sperm donor and the recipient’s 
husband by providing that the recipient’s father ‘is treated in law as if he were the 
natural father of a child thereby conceived’ and by providing that the donor ‘is 
treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.’27 
 
Many states that adopted a version of the model act amended the statutory language.28 The most 
common alteration of the model act text was omitting the word married.29 No proviso is included 
in the model act addressing the rights of unmarried women or lesbian couples seeking children.30  
Outside of its limited focus, one of the most problematic aspects of the model act is the 
requirement that a “licensed physician” is used in the insemination process.31 Requiring the use 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Fiser, supra note 18, at 11. 
26 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973). 
27 In re R.C., 775 P.2d 27, 32 (Colo. 1989).  
28 See, e.g., supra note 12 and accompanying text.  
29 In re K.M.H., 285 P.3d 53, 72 (Kan. 2007). 
30 Fiser, supra note 18, at 13-14. 
31 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 5 (1973) (“The donor of a semen provided to a licensed physician . . .”). 
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of a licensed physician serves no medical purpose.32 Getting pregnant through use of artificial 
insemination is “not a medical procedure that can only be safely performed by a licensed 
physician. Therefore, the statutory mandate with regards to the involvement of a licensed 
physician is superfluous.”33 Forcing women to go to a licensed physician also “offend[s] a 
woman’s sense of privacy and reproductive autonomy.”34 Moreover, the licensed physician 
requirement disproportionately harms lower income individuals and lesbian couples.35 “Many 
hospitals or clinics have strict policies against aiding ‘unwed’ women with fertility.”36 Finally, 
the most fundamentally flawed aspect of requiring the use of a licensed physician is that 
pregnancy rates are significantly higher when fresh sperm is used versus frozen sperm from a 
sperm bank.37 
B. The 2002 Uniform Parentage Act 
 
 If the 1973 UPA provision was hampered by its limited focus and unnecessary 
requirement that a licensed physician is used, then the 2002 UPA provision represents a 
substantial improvement in the law governing parentage and artificial insemination. Under 
section 702, “[a] donor is not a parent of a child conceived by means of assisted reproduction.”38 
No distinction is made between known and unknown sperm donors. Section 703 further protects 
the parties’ intentions by holding that “[a] man who provides sperm for, or consents to, assisted 
reproduction by a woman . . . with the intent to be the parent of her child, is a parent of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Lewis, supra note 22, at 975-76. 
33Id.   
34 Jhordan C. v Mary K., 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 394 (1986). 
35 See Lewis, supra note 22, at 976. (“[T]he requirement that a licensed physician perform the procedure 
makes the process cost prohibitive to some couples.”). 
36Fiser, supra note 18, at 5.  
37 Lewis, supra note 22, at 1004. 
38 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (amended 2002); see also id. Comment (“In sum, donors are eliminated 
from the parental equation.”). 
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resulting child.”39 Such intent must be evidenced by writing.40 Moreover, the requirement that a 
licensed physician must be used in the artificial insemination process is eliminated.41 
While representing a substantial improvement over the 1973 UPA, the 2002 UPA is still 
lacking in a few respects. Chiefly, the most problematic aspect of the 2002 UPA is that so few 
states have adopted the Act.42 Even in the few states adopting some version of the 2002 UPA, 
“courts continue to struggle” in its application.43 Similar to the 1973 UPA, the 2002 version is 
limited to heterosexual relationships.44 The plain language of section 703 states that “[a] man 
who provides sperm . . .” can enter an agreement to be the father.45 Parentage issues concerning 
lesbians and their sperm donors are left unaddressed. Consequently, while the 2002 UPA does 
provide greater protection for known sperm donors, the operation of the statute does not fully 
protect parties’ intentions and expectations.46 
II.   INTENT BASED PARENTAGE: A SOLUTION TO A DIFFICULT PROBLEM 
 
Biology and adoption have been the primary means through which to establish 
parentage.47 Establishing parentage through intention is a relatively recent phenomenon.48 
Modern technology, however, “has greatly enhanced the potential for intention in procreative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002). 
40 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 704 (amended 2002).  The writing must be signed by the woman and the 
man. Id. 
41 Id. 
42 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
43 Fiser, supra note 18, at 11. 
44 Id. 
45 UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 703 (amended 2002). 
46 Fiser, supra note 18, at 14-15. 
47 Melanie B. Jacobs, Applying Intent-Based Parentage Principles to Nonlegal Lesbian Coparents, 25 N. 
ILL. U. L. REV. 433, 434 (2005). 
48 Majorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for 
Gender Neutrality, 1990 WISC. L. REV. 297, 304 (1990) (“Through most of history, biological procreation was more 
a matter of fate than intention.”). 
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activities.”49 As a result, “intent is playing an ever-increasing role in parentage 
determinations.”50 
A. Johnson v. Calvert: The Introduction of Intent Based Parentage 
  
 Johnson v. Calvert was one of the first cases to address intent based parentage.51 In 
Johnson, there were three parties involved.52 Mark and Crispina were a married couple who were 
unable to conceive.53 After hearing about the couple’s trouble, Anna approached the couple and 
offered to act as their surrogate.54 The couple agreed and a contract was signed, which provided 
that the sperm of Mark and egg of Crispina would be implanted in Anna.55 Further, Anna would 
be compensated, but in return she would “relinquish ‘all parental rights’ to the child.”56 
The relationship deteriorated between the parties to the point that Anna filed a lawsuit to 
be named the child’s mother.57 Both woman “presented acceptable proof of maternity” under the 
relevant California statute.58 Crispina was the genetic mother and Anna was the birth mother.59 
Facing such an intractable problem, the court inquired “into the parties’ intentions as manifested 
in the surrogacy agreement.”60 What the surrogacy agreement revealed was that if Mark and 
Anna had not acted on their intention to have a child through use of a surrogate, the child would 
have never existed.61 Therefore, “she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to raise as her own—is the natural 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Id. 
50 Melanie B. Jacobs, Intentional Parenthood’s Influence: Rethinking Procreative Autonomy and Paternity 
Establishment Policy, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 489, 492 (2012). 
51 Jacobs, supra note 47, at 438. 
52 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 782. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
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mother under California law.”62 One notable limitation emerging from the Johnson court’s intent 
based test is that “intent was not used as the sole means of establishing maternity; rather, as 
between two competing options, the court used intent as a tie-breaker to choose one mother.”63 
Some later courts have applied the intention doctrine narrowly.64 
B. Further Development of Intent Based Parentage 
 
 Following Johnson, “intent has been used as a proxy for biology to establish legal 
parentage.”65 Attendant with the increased use of intent in determining parentage has been the 
rise in use of assistive reproductive technologies.66 Intent based determinations of parentage are 
uniquely suited for artificial insemination cases.67 Unlike ordinary sexual relations, where 
procreation might be “a goal or a by-product, or anything in between,” when parties decide to 
use artificial insemination, procreation is clearly the goal.68 Intention both “conveys the 
directness, specificity and lack of ambiguity with which voluntary behavior is linked to outcome 
by purpose” and “connotes choice, or selection among available courses of action.”69  
Resulting from the close relationship between intention and the use of artificial 
insemination, many scholars now argue that parties’ intentions regarding parental rights and 
responsibilities should be respected.70 In fact, Professor Shultz stated that “within the context of 
artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Id. 
63 Jacobs, supra note 47, at 439. 
64 See id. at 437-439 (describing cases in which Johnson’s intent doctrine was narrowly applied). 
65 Jacobs, supra note 50, at 489. 
66 Shultz, supra note 48, at 307 (“Modern reproductive technology has greatly enhanced the potential for 
intention in procreative behavior.”). 
67 Id. at 308. (“Procreating by ordinary coital means necessarily includes a degree of ambiguity regarding 
purpose.”). 
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 307. 
70 See e.g., Jacobs, supra note 50, at 492 (stating that one court’s approach “recognizes the importance of 
intent within procreative liberty, regarding both the right to choose to parent and the right to choose not parent.”); 
Fiser, supra note 18, at 27 (“Informed parties—whether gay, lesbian, or straight—should be allowed to make their 
own decisions about their rights and abilities to procreate.”); Lewis, supra note 22, at 975-76 (discussing how the 
primary goal of artificial insemination statutes should be to protect the parties’ intentions).  
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bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal parenthood.”71 There has been some 
recognition in statutes of intent based parentage.72 In the 2002 UPA, “parentage may be 
established by something other than biology or adoption.”73 However, as will be demonstrated in 
Part III, many court decisions directly contradict parties’ intentions.74 Moreover, in the context of 
federal law governing child support and paternity determination, an unwary sperm donor can be 
adjudged liable for support despite the parties’ intentions to the contrary.75 
III.   POINT AND SHOOT: THE INCONSISTENT APPROACH OF STATE COURT DECISIONS 
INVOLVING KNOWN SPERM DONORS 
  
 State court decisions concerning the parental rights and responsibilities for known sperm 
donors are inconsistent.76 Different outcomes can be found even for factual scenarios that are 
similar.77 Many states lack of applicable artificial insemination statutes compound the problem 
of inconsistent outcomes,78 as do public policy decisions between a party’s right to contract and a 
child’s best interest.79 
A. Misaligned or Unclear Intentions: Possible Problem with Intent Based Standard 
  
Having a child is a life-altering decision. In a best case scenario, the prospective parents 
should presumably have clear intentions regarding becoming parents; however, parties often 
have different intentions and expectations. These misaligned or unclear intentions can cause 
problems for courts when one party brings suit to establish or terminate parental rights. The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Shultz, supra note 48, at 323. 
72 See Jacobs, supra note 47, at 435. 
73 Id. 
74 See infra Part III.A-B. 
75 Jacobs, supra note 50, at 504 (“A women who receives public assistance is required to comply with the 
state IV-D agency and name the person (or persons) she believes might be the father of the child, and the state then 
pursues a paternity order for the purpose of obtaining a support order.”). 
76 See infra Part III.A-B. 
77 Compare, E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283 (2011) (refusing to enforce written agreement 
disclaiming known sperm donor’s parental rights and responsibilities), with Ferguson v. McKiernan, 596 Pa. 78 
(2007) (enforcing an oral agreement disclaiming known sperm donor’s parental rights and responsibilities). 
78 See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
79 See Ferguson, 596 Pa. at 100-01 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (arguing that a child’s best interest should be 
elevated over the right to contract).  
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outcomes courts are forced to make necessarily leave one party’s parental rights and 
responsibilities impacted in an unintended manner.80  
1. Donor Has Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
One of the first cases to address to address the parental rights and responsibilities of a 
known sperm donor was C.M. v. C.C.81 In the case, CM, the eventual sperm donor, and CC, the 
biological mother, were friends who agreed that CM would provide CC with his sperm.82 The 
artificial insemination was completed without the assistance of a physician and after several 
unsuccessful attempts CC was able to get pregnant.83 After the child was conceived, CM initiated 
a suit to get visitation rights.84 New Jersey had no statute addressing the parental rights of a 
known sperm donor. The parties’ intentions were misaligned: CM contended that the pair agreed 
he would assume the responsibilities of being the father and CC contended that CM waived his 
parental rights.85 Between the two positions, the court held that CM’s “consent and active 
participation in the procedure leading to conception should place upon him the responsibilities of 
fatherhood.”86 
Similar to the parties in C.M. v. C.C., the parties in Jhordan C. v. Mary K. had misaligned 
intentions.87 Mary and Jhordan were acquaintances who agreed, after an interview, that Jhordan 
would provide Mary with his sperm to use for artificial insemination.88 Mary was in a 
relationship at the time with Victoria; the two women wanted to raise a child together.89 No 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 See infra Part III.A-B. 
81 152 N.J. Super. 160 (1977). 
82 Id. at 161. 
83 Id. (“C.C. learned, as a result of her conversation with the doctor, of a procedure for artificial 
insemination using a glass syringe and a glass jar.”). 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 167. 
86 Id. 
87 179 Cal. App. 3d 386, 389 (1986). 
88 Id.  
89 Id. 
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written agreement was drafted evidencing the parties’ intentions.90 Mary performed the 
insemination process without the assistance of a physician.91 Up to the child’s birth, and for 
some time following the child’s birth, Jhordan was involved as a parent.92 Eventually, Mary 
decided to terminate Jhordan’s involvement as a parent, and even asked Jhordan to “sign a 
contract indicating he would not seek” to be the child’s father.93 This request was refused and 
litigation ensued.94  
At trial, the parties’ testimony was significantly divergent regarding the role Jhordan was 
expected to play in the child’s life.95 Mary testified that Jhordan’s role was simply that of a 
donor.96 Jhordan testified that “he would have ongoing contact with the child, and he would care 
for the child as much as two or three times per week.”97 Unlike in C.C., in Jhordan C., the 
California legislature had adopted a version of the UPA.98 Under the clear text of the statute, 
Mary could have precluded Jhordan’s involvement by “obtaining the semen . . . from a chosen 
donor through a licensed physician.”99 Further bolstering the court’s decision to award Jhordan 
parental rights, outside of the clear statutory text, was the fact that “[t]he record demonstrates no 
clear understanding that Jhordan’s role would be limited to the provision of semen and that he 
would have no relationship with [the child]; indeed, the parties’ conduct indicates otherwise.”100 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Id. at 390. 
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92 Id. at 396. (“The semen donor here was permitted to develop a social relationship with Mary and Devin 
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The outcomes in C.C. and Jhordan C. demonstrate the limits of a strictly intent based 
test. If the parties’ intentions are misaligned or unclear, courts are forced to make decisions that 
invariably cause an undesired outcome for one party. C.O. v. W.S. is one of the more recent 
decisions to grant a known sperm donor parental rights and responsibilities against the wishes of 
the child’s mother.101 Unlike the previous cases, in C.O., the mother and known sperm donor 
were not friends or acquaintances, but in a relationship.102 Another difference from the earlier 
cases is that the parties had an oral agreement that W.S., the sperm donor, would be a “male role 
model.”103 The oral agreement was ultimately insufficient, however, because the parties still 
disputed whether W.S. would “have all the rights and responsibilities of fatherhood.”104 Similar 
to the California legislature in Jhordan, the Ohio legislature in C.O. had adopted a version of the 
1973 UPA.105  
In awarding W.S. parental rights and responsibilities, the court held that W.S. was not 
precluded from attempting to seek parental rights because a licensed physician was not used in 
the artificial insemination process.106 Lockstep adherence to the statutory text and the parties’ 
unclear intentions prevented the court from reaching any other outcome. The court stated that 
even if a licensed physician was used, “[t]he statute does not prevent a paternity adjudication 
where an unmarried woman solicits the participation of the donor, who was known to her, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 64 Ohio Misc. 2d 9, 10 (1994). 
102 Id. at 10. 
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105 Id. at 11. (“If a woman is the subject of a non-spousal artificial insemination, the donor shall not be 
treated in law or regarded as the natural father of a child conceived as a result of the artificial insemination, and a 
child so conceived shall not be treated in law or regarded as the natural child of the donor. No action under sections 
3111.01 to 3111.19 of the Revised Code shall affect these consequences.”). 
106 Id. at 12. 
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where the donor and woman agree that there would be a relationship between the donor and 
child.”107  
2. Donor Has No Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
In direct contrast to the outcomes in C.M., Jhordan, and C.O., in In re K.M.H., the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that a known sperm donor did not have any parental rights or 
responsibilities.108 S.H., the biological mother of the contested twins, instituted a suit to 
terminate the parental rights of D.H., the known sperm donor.109 In a familiar refrain, S.H. and 
D.H. were friends who agreed that D.H. would provide S.H. with his sperm.110 Little evidence is 
presented in the case about the extent of D.H.’s involvement in the pregnancy, other than that he 
accompanied D.H. to one clinic visit.111 Clearly stated by the court, however, was that there “was 
no formal written contract . . . concerning . . . the expectations of the parties with regard to 
D.H.’s parental rights or lack thereof.”112  
In deciding the case, the court was able to rely on a version of the 1973 UPA.113 Of 
special import to the court was the writing requirement in the statute. Under the statute, “the 
male will never be a potential or actual parent unless there is a written agreement to that effect 
with the female.”114 The writing requirement served two purposes. First, “it encourages men who 
are able and willing to donate sperm to such women by protecting the men from later unwanted 
claims for support from the mothers or the children.”115 Second, requiring a written agreement 
“protects women recipients as well, preventing potential claims of donors to parental rights and 
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108  285 P.3d 1025, 1044 (Kan. 2007). 
109 Id. at 1029. 
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113 Id. at 1038. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (f) (West). 
114 In re K.M.H., 285 P.3d at 1039. 
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responsibilities, in the absence of an agreement.”116 Other commentators have opined that a 
written agreement “protects intent because it sets out clear directions for parties who wish to 
provide for a parenting situation outside of the statutory default.”117 Moreover, allowing parties 
to enter into contracts that delineate rights enforcing the wishes of those parties would “remove 
the prejudice and bias of certain judges in AI cases.”118 Finally, written agreements “encourag[e] 
careful consideration of entry into parenthood.”119 
In the case, however, there was no written agreement and the parties’ intentions were not 
clear; therefore, the court relied on another element of the statute: the licensed physician 
requirement.120 D.H.’s sperm was provided to a licensed physician.121 Without an agreement to 
the contrary, the default position of the Kansas statute precluded D.H. from seeking parental 
rights.122 The court was clear that “the statute tells [the sperm donor] how to opt out, how to 
become and remain a parent.”123 
3. Donor Might Have Parental Rights and Responsibilities  
In In re R.C., the lack of written agreement and uncertain meaning of Colorado’s 
artificial insemination statute so flummoxed the court that it eventually remanded the case for a 
rehearing to determine the parties’ intentions.124 The suit was brought by J.R., the known sperm 
donor, to establish his paternity.125 J.R. and E.C., the biological mother, were either friends or 
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117 Elizabeth E. McDonald, Student Note, Sperm Donor or Thwarted Father? How Written Agreement 
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118 Fiser, supra note 18, at 27. 
119 In re K.M.H., 285 P.3d at 1040. 
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acquaintances, depending on whose characterization of the relationship was to be believed.126 
J.R. provided his sperm to a licensed physician, and using his sperm, E.C. was able to give 
birth.127 There was not a written agreement between the parties, but J.R. stated that “E.C. 
promised that [he] would be treated as the father of any child conceived by the artificial 
insemination.”128 Moreover, he opened a trust fund, started a college fund, created a nursery at 
his home, attended birthing classes, attended E.C.’s baby showers, and cared for the child when 
he was first born.129 All of J.R.’s assertions concerning the parties’ intentions were disputed by 
E.C.130 
Similar to most states that have adopted an artificial insemination statute, Colorado’s 
version was based off of the 1973 UPA.131 However, the court concluded that the statute was 
“ambiguous with respect to the rights and duties of known sperm donors and unmarried 
recipients.”132 Further, the court found that “the intent of the known donor and unmarried 
recipient is relevant to a determination of parental rights under the model UPA.”133 If the parties’ 
intentions were aligned regarding whether J.R. would have his parental rights and responsibilities 
preserved, then the parties’ intentions should control the result.134 Unfortunately, the lack of 
written agreement meant that the court was unable to make a final decision because “a factual 
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dispute remain[ed] as to whether J.R. and E.C. at the time of insemination agreed that J.R. would 
be the natural father.”135 
B. Aligned Intentions: Interference with Private Family Ordering Caused by Statutes, Judges, 
and Changed Intentions 
  
 Directly contrasting those situations where the parties’ intentions are misaligned are 
factual situations where the parties’ intentions regarding the parental rights and responsibilities 
of the known donor are aligned. However, even when the parties reach an agreement concerning 
parental rights and responsibilities, courts still struggle to effectuate the parties’ intentions.136 In 
some cases the court refused to honor the parties’ intentions for statutory reasons and in other 
cases the court refused to honor the parties’ intentions because of a lack of a written 
agreement.137 Regardless of the reasons, even where parties’ intentions are aligned, court 
decisions have impacted the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors in 
undesired ways.138 
 1. Donor Has Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 In Mintz v. Zoernig, the court was confronted with the problem of what to do when the 
parties change their intention.139 The biological mother was a longtime friend of the eventual 
sperm donor.140 Living with her partner, the biological mother ultimately convinced her friend to 
provide his sperm with the understanding that “the women would be the primary parents.”141 
Without using a licensed physician, the biological mother impregnated herself.142 After the child 
was born, the donor, biological mother, and the mother’s partner “reduced their agreement into 
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writing.”143 Soon after, the relationship between the two women ended.144  By comparison, the 
relationship between the known sperm donor and the biological mother continued.145 One more 
child would be conceived using the same donor’s sperm; however, instead of a written 
agreement, the parties orally agreed that the donor would not be financially responsible for the 
child, but would act as a “male role model.”146  
 For nearly five years after the birth of the first child, the parties “acted in accordance with 
the agreement[s].”147 Eventually, however, the mother sought child support from the known 
sperm donor.148 Before each of the two children were born the parties’ intentions were clear: the 
donor father would not have any financial responsibilities towards the children and would only 
be minimally involved as a male role model. The court, however, held that because a licensed 
physician was not used in the insemination process, the protections offered for known sperm 
donors in the New Mexico artificial insemination statute were inapplicable.149 Moreover, the 
donor acted like more than a male role model. He held “himself out as the children’s father” and 
“enjoyed regular visitation with each child.”150 The parties’ agreement intended one outcome, 
but the parties’ actions were not in line with those intentions. 
 2. Donor Has No Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 Like the parties in Mintz, the parties in Ferguson v. McKiernan had aligned intentions 
and an agreement evidencing their aligned intention, concerning the known sperm donor’s 
parental rights and responsibilities.151 Ferguson, the biological mother, and McKiernan, the 
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known sperm donor, were formerly in a relationship together.152 Ferguson attempted on multiple 
occasions to convince McKiernan to donate his sperm.153 Finally relenting, McKiernan donated 
his sperm on the condition that he would not seek any parental rights and Ferguson would not 
attempt to impose any parental responsibilities.154 McKiernan provided his sperm to a licensed 
physician and Ferguson was eventually able to get pregnant.155 Unlike the known donor in Mintz, 
during and after the pregnancy, McKiernan had almost no further involvement with Ferguson.  
Years following the birth of the children Ferguson attempted to secure child support.156 
 Pennsylvania, like many other states, had no artificial insemination statute.157 The court 
struggled in reaching its conclusion. Despite a lower court ruling to the contrary, McKiernan was 
not responsible for child support because  
they negotiated an agreement outside the context of a romantic relationship; they 
agreed to terms; they sought clinical assistance to effectuate IVF and implantation 
of the consequent embryos, taking sexual intercourse out of the equation; they 
attempted to hide Sperm Donor's paternity from medical personnel, friends, and 
family; and for approximately five years following the birth of the twins both 
parties behaved in every regard consistently with the intentions they expressed at 
the outset of their arrangement, Sperm Donor not seeking to serve as a father to 
the twins, and Mother not demanding his support, financial or otherwise.158 
 
If Ferguson were allowed to disregard her clear initial intention and vitiate the parties’ 
agreement, then Ferguson would not only be harming McKiernan, but also future women and 
future known sperm donors.159 The dissent, however, strongly objected to the majority’s decision 
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shrouded in mystery. To much the same end, where a would-be donor cannot trust that he is safe 
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on the basis that it failed to protect the best interests of the child.160 To counteract the dissent’s 
concern, the court noted that, “[a]bsent the parties’ agreement . . . the twins would not have been 
born at all.”161 Denying a source of support for the children was troubling; however, a contrary 
result would have harmed the procreative liberty of all parties involved and future potential 
parents.162 Interestingly, the result in the case would likely have been the same had Pennsylvania 
adopted either version of the UPA.163 
 3. Donor Might Have Parental Rights and Responsibilities 
 A case of more recent vintage addressing the parental rights and responsibilities of 
known sperm donors is E.E. v. O.M.G.R.164 The decision in E.E. fully demonstrates courts’ rigid 
adherence to statutory provisions.165 O.M.G.R., the known donor, was a friend of E.E.166 No 
licensed physician was used in the artificial insemination process.167 However, the parties did 
enter into a written agreement “whereby [O.M.G.R.] contracted to surrender and terminate all 
future rights and responsibilities to the child and [E.E.] assumed all financial responsibility for 
the child.”168 After the child’s birth, both parties attempted to get the court to enter a consent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
from a future support action, he will be considerably less likely to provide his sperm to a friend or 
acquaintance who asks, significantly limiting a would-be mother's reproductive prerogatives. 
 
160 See id. at 100-01 (Eakin, J., dissenting) (arguing that a child’s best interest should be elevated over the 
right to contract). 
161 Id. at 97 (majority opinion). 
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163 See UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §§ 702-704 (amended 2002); see also UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT §5 
(1973). 
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165 See id. at 289 (discussing the various requirements under the statute). 
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21	  
	  
order reflecting the parties’ agreement and intentions to terminate O.M.G.R.’s parental rights.169 
The court refused.170 
 Unlike the court in Ferguson, the court in E.E. elevated statutory miasma over the 
parties’ clear intentions as evidenced by a written agreement.171 Under the New Jersey artificial 
insemination statute, in order for a known sperm donor to not have parental rights and 
responsibilities a licensed physician must be used.172 The court refused “to ignore a portion of 
the statute because of the parties’ intent.”173 While the court failed to terminate O.M.G.R.’s 
parental rights, it did hold that the parties themselves were free to follow the agreement.174 No 
child support or visitation was ordered.175 Presumably, O.M.G.R. could still be liable in the 
future for child support if E.E. or the state of New Jersey sought such support. 176 
IV. UTILIZING AN INTENT BASED ANALYSIS, AGREEMENTS DISCLAIMING PARENTAL 
RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN KNOWN SPERM DONORS AND THE PROSPECTIVE PARENT 
OR PARENTS SHOULD BE UPHELD 
 
 The court in E.E. v. O.M.G.R. described the fact situation it was presented with as 
“unusual.”177 In cases from across the country, however, courts have been forced to determine 
the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors.178 This has compelled courts to 
look at statutes predating the exploding use of the artificial insemination process, or even more 
problematically to look at inapplicable common law rules.179 Elevating irrelevant statutory 
requirements, like mandating the use of a licensed physician, over the parties’ clear intentions 
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has led to problematic outcomes.180 A new standard for determining the parental rights and 
responsibilities of known sperm donors must incorporate and respect the idea of intentional 
parentage.181 Under an intent based analysis, written agreements disclaiming the parental rights 
and responsibilities of a known sperm donor should be enforced. Courts should limit their 
involvement in private family ordering when consenting parties reach a written agreement 
concerning the parental rights and responsibilities of a known sperm donor. 
A. A Powerful Combination: Intent Based Parentage Combined with a Written Agreement 
 Modern private family ordering presents a seemingly intractable problem area for courts.  
Since the advent of the common law system, biology and adoption have been the primary means 
through which to establish parentage.182 In cases involving known sperm donors, however, 
biology is ill-suited to determine parental rights and responsibilities. As evidenced in the Marotta 
case, many times the donor’s only contribution is limited to genetic material.183 Ignoring the 
obvious limitations of the donor’s involvement, courts still find it incumbent to impose parental 
responsibilities on parties.184   
An intent based approach, by comparison, is not so limited. While, “[p]rocreating by 
ordinary coital means necessarily includes a degree of ambiguity regarding purpose,” the advent 
of “[m]odern reproductive technology has greatly enhanced the potential for intention in 
procreative behavior.”185 Intention “connotes choice, or selection among available courses of 
action” and those intentions should be respected by courts.186 Therefore,	   “intentions that are 
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voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought presumptively to determine legal 
parenthood.”187   
One of the main concerns with adopting an intent based approach to determining the 
parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors is that identifying parties’ intentions 
can often be difficult.188 Intentions can be unclear or parties can change their intentions.  
Ambiguity problems are solved by written agreements. Clear evidence of parties’ intentions is 
provided by written agreements.189 Written agreements also eliminate the need for a court to 
engage in an often futile attempt to divine parties’ intentions.190 Moreover, written agreements 
protect both the persons desiring to become parents and the known sperm donor willing to 
donate his sperm.191 
Current statutory approaches are riddled with shortcomings. Requiring the use of a 
licensed physician, for example, discriminates against low-income individuals, unwed women, 
and lesbians.192 Yet strict adherence to these statutory requirements is endemic in court decisions 
delineating the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors.193 Even the most 
recent UPA provisions covering sperm donation, which eliminate the licensed physician 
requirement, are limited to heterosexual couples.194 As noted forcefully by one commentator, 
“[i]nformed parties—whether gay, lesbian or straight—should be allowed to make their own 
decisions about their rights and abilities to procreate.	  Allowing parties to enter into contracts that 
delineate rights enforcing the wishes of those parties would remove the prejudice and bias of 
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certain judges in AI cases.”195 Written agreements clearly evidencing parties’ intentions 
regarding the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors should be enforced.  
Other approaches have proven futile, and have led to wildly different outcomes, which are 
dependent on courts’ biases and interpretation of ineffective statutes. 
Arguments can be made to the contrary. One argument is that known sperm donors 
should be treated no differently from a man who has sexual intercourse with a woman.196  Such 
an argument was made by the dissent in Ferguson, who noted forcefully that for children 
resulting from normal sexual intercourse “[a] parent cannot bargain away the children’s right to 
support.”197 In the case of a known sperm donor, “[the] only difference in this case and any other 
contraception [i.e., sexual intercourse] is the intervention of hardware between one identifiable 
parent and another.”198 However, there are two poles on the continuum of procreative techniques. 
On one end of the continuum is a sexual encounter, which “requires both parents to provide 
support.”199 On the other end of the continuum is an anonymous sperm donation, for which there 
is a near consensus “neither imposes obligations nor confers privileges upon the sperm donor.”200  
No “principled basis” exists for a distinction between known and unknown sperm donors.201 
When parties have a shared intention evidenced by a writing regarding the parental rights and 
responsibilities of a known sperm donor, the fact that the donor is known should not change the 
outcome.202 Therefore, on the continuum, known sperm donors are more akin to unknown sperm 
donors, who do not have parental rights and responsibilities imposed on them. 
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Another argument made against enforcing parties’ clearly evidenced intentions regarding 
the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors is such agreements are not in a 
child’s best interest because the child loses a possible source of support.203 There are many 
strong countervailing reasons not to impose parental rights and responsibilities on known sperm 
donors contrary to parties’ clear intentions, especially the procreative liberty of prospective 
parents.204 Further, in many cases there already were two parents available, but one parent was 
the biological mother’s lesbian partner.205 If courts would overcome their own biases against 
certain potential parents, then the courts would not be forced to impose parental rights and 
responsibilities on known sperm donors against parties’ clear intentions. Moreover, courts are 
arguably misinterpreting the nature of a contract between a known sperm donor and a potential 
parent.  One scholar argues that  
the contracts between sperm recipient and sperm donor are not contracts for 
paternity or contracts necessarily delineating the rights of the child; these 
contracts are drawn up prior to insemination and are contracts for the donation of 
sperm, not necessarily about the custody or creation of a child. At most, these are 
contracts for potential children. The donor is not donating a child, he is donating 
sperm that may or may not result in the recipient’s impregnation.206  
 
If there was no agreement in place “no child would exist in the first place, no child whose ‘best 
interest’ trump the intents of the donor and donee.”207 Resultantly, clearly evidenced intentions 
disclaiming the parental rights and responsibilities of a known sperm donor should be enforced. 
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B. Predicting Outcomes for the Craigslist Father 
 Unfortunately for William Marotta, the state of Kansas has adopted a version of the 1973 
UPA.208 Pursuant to the statute, the only way for a known sperm donor to avoid having parental 
rights and responsibilities is to use a licensed physician.209 Marotta did not provide his sperm to a 
licensed physician.210 Forcing parties to use a licensed physician is problematic on a number of 
levels.211 In Marotta’s case, however, it is particularly odious because Angie Bauer and Jennifer 
Schreiner’s doctor refused to deem them fit parents.212 Therefore, if Marotta refused to donate 
his sperm, the women would have been completely prevented from being parents despite a long-
history of raising children.213 Stuck between undesirable outcomes—Marotta forced to have 
parental rights and responsibilities or the women prevented from having a child—the parties 
reached a sensible solution. The parties entered into an explicit written contract clearly 
evidencing their intentions.214 
 Factually, Marotta’s case is most similar to the donors in Ferguson and E.E.215 For 
Marotta, and the known sperm donors in Ferguson and E.E., there was an agreement evidencing 
the parties’ aligned intentions: the known donor would have no parental rights or 
responsibilities.216 In Ferguson, the court correctly respected the parties’ agreement; in E.E., the 
court refused to enforce the parties’ written agreement.217 Marotta, however, also committed the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-2208 (f) (West). 
209 Id. 
210 Van Dye, supra note 4. 
211 See supra Part I.A. 
212 Saletan, supra note 7. 
213 Id. 
214 Chuck, supra note 8. 
215 Compare, E.E. v. O.M.G.R., 420 N.J. Super. 283 (2011) (refusing to enforce written agreement 
disclaiming known sperm donor’s parental rights and responsibilities), and Ferguson v. McKiernan, 596 Pa. 78 
(2007) (enforcing an oral agreement disclaiming known sperm donor’s parental rights and responsibilities). 
216See Ferguson, 596 Pa. at 81 (describing oral agreement); E.E., 420 N.J. Super. at 286 (describing written 
agreement). 
217 Ferguson, 596 Pa. at 95; E.E., 420 N.J. Super. at 285. 
27	  
	  
devastating error, in many courts’ view, of not using a licensed physician.218 In Jhordan C. v. 
Mary K., C.O. v. W.S., Mintz v. Zoernig, and E.E., the parties also failed to use a licensed 
physician.219 Failure to use a licensed physician allowed the court in each referenced case to 
reach a conclusion that frustrated the intentions of one or both parties.220 Therefore, in Marotta’s 
case the court might have an avenue to disregard the parties’ aligned intentions. The court, 
however, should not; not only were the parties’ intentions aligned, but the parties evidenced 
those clear intentions in a written agreement. Adherence to a statute formulated before the rise in 
use of artificial insemination should not take precedence over intentions so clearly evidenced. 
 Additionally, there is case law in Kansas that directly undercuts arguments the state 
might make against Marotta. In In re K.M.H., the Kansas Supreme Court held that a known 
sperm had no parental rights or responsibilities.221 The basis for the suit against Marotta is that 
the Kansas is seeking a source of support for a child.222 Notice, however, that in K.M.H., the 
court closed off one avenue for potential child support. Moreover, before making its holding, the 
court also stated that under the applicable artificial insemination statute, “the male will never be 
a potential or actual parent unless there is a written agreement to that affect with the female.”223 
The only difference for possible outcomes in K.M.H. and Marotta’s case, therefore, is that 
Marotta failed to provide his semen to a licensed physician.224 Effectively, the state’s argument is 
based off an unnecessary and problematic portion of an outdated statute. 
Kansas’s argument cannot be based off of the desire to find a source of support for a 
child because that concern was completely ignored in K.M.H.  Holding Marotta responsible for 
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support payments would lead to very harmful consequences for women’s procreative liberty.  
Women with means will be able to choose their sperm donors without fear because such women 
will be able to afford to use a licensed physician. Poor women and their sperm donors will have 
no such peace of mind, even if they clearly evidence their intentions in writing, because poor 
women are unable to afford using a licensed physician.225 It is a dangerous precedent to imbue a 
fundamental liberty interest,226 “with a sliding scale of wealth.”227 Courts should enforce parties’ 
intentions regarding the parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm as evidenced in 
written agreements. 
CONCLUSION 
 
“[M]ore than one-percent of children born in the United States annually,” are the result of 
assisted reproductive technology procedures, including artificial insemination.228 Despite the 
increased use of artificial insemination, courts have still been unable to develop a clear and 
consistent test for determining paternity. Most states lack statutes addressing paternity for known 
sperm donors.229 The minority of states that have statutes have created statutory schemes based 
on the 1973 Uniform Parentage Act that do not protect parties’ intentions. Written agreements 
either creating or terminating parental rights and responsibilities of known sperm donors should 
be enforced. Written agreements are clear expressions of parties’ intentions and protect all 
involved in the artificial insemination process. Only in the absence of written agreements 
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evidencing parties’ intent should courts resort to the default mechanisms in statutes or consider 
other issues such as public policy. 
